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The Formation of Diplomatic Policy in New China and its Main(2)

来源:网络收集 时间:2012-08-28 下载这篇文档 手机版
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  Mao Zedong‘s decision quickly met with opposition from his colleagues.It isstill not certain how many of the decision-makers opposed him ,but the numbercould not have been small since Mao Zedong was forced to change his decision .

  Two factors were responsible for reversing the decision to send troops to Korea:Firstly,some of the decision-makers did not approve of dispatching troops.In their opinion,the first priority should be given to domestic needs.Secondly ,even Mao Zedong himself ,although full of revolutionary fervor and strongly infavor of sending troops ,had serious misgivings and believed that military failurewould have serious political,economic and security consequences for China.

  Under such circumstances,pressure from Stalin played a decisive role.In histelegram to Mac Zedong on about 5October Stalin stressed that China‘s participationin the war would compel the US to make concessions and "give up Taiwan,"and thatChina "could not even get Taiwan’‘if it did not enter the war.20Stalin ’s hintat possible betrayal of China over thc question of Taiwan must have had a profoundimpact on the Chinese leaders.Stalin issued a more serious warning in his talkswith Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao on 11October.He stressed that American occupationof North Korea would pose a Long term threat to the security of China and exerta negative influence on economic development in the northeast.Furthermore,ifNorth Korea fell,its cadres and main forces would swarm into northeast China.21

  According to documents made public.Chinese leaders in BeiJing had already receivedreports about Stalin‘s view before 13October.Mao Zedong’s telegram to Zhou Enlaion 13October showed that he was giving first priority to national security.Inthe same telegram Mao Zedong instructed Zhou Enlai to secure Soviet weapons on creditso that the national budget would guarantee the needs of economic and cultural construction;only in this way could China sustain the war effort in Korea for any length oftime and "`maintain the unity of the majority at home."22On the same day Mao Zedongsummoned the Soviet ambassador to China ,Nocola Rosin ,to an interview and saidto him that China was unable to buy Soviet weapons in cash and had to get them oncredit.in this way the 1951national budget would not be disrupted and "the democraticparties would be more easily convinced of our argument for entering the war ."23

  When Mao Zedong finally decided to send troops to Korea he had shifted the focusof his concern from "fulfilling the international duty‘’to the interests of nationalsecurity.At the same time,he also tried his utmost to reduce the negative impactof entering the war on the efforts to improve the war-torn economy and thereby toovercome resistance to his decision.It could therefore be concluded that China‘s role in the Korean War did not fundamentally alter the introversion of New China’s diplomacy ;only a new balance between introversion and extroversion was achieved,with a bias towards introversion.

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