With respect to this empiricism, the following philosophical principles of the Critical School are of inspiring significance.
1) The principle of conceptual evolution.
Mach believed that concepts are not absolutely, permanently valid. Rather, they can evolve. Whenever concepts seem inapplicable, they can be revised best and quickest by facts. When a concept which is valid within a specific, narrow scientific field fails to apply to a new area of research, the creation of a new concept which is applicable to a broader research area is required. Evolved concepts can not only explain different sciences but can also surpass the limited areas for which they were created and achieve widespread application.40 At the turn of the century when the concepts of physics were undergoing rapid change, this principle of Mach’s was obviously of positive value. Einstein totally agreed with it and noted that he was greatly inspired by it. He himself significantly expanded and applied this principle.41 Sharing Einstein’s flexible attitude toward concepts, N. Bohr proposed the “correspondence principle.” W. Heisenberg even thought that the development of physics is essentially the development of concepts.
2) The principle of the relativity of knowledge.
Duhem repeatedly pointed out that “every law of physics is provisional and relative because it is approximate…A law of physics is, properly speaking, neither true nor false, but approximate.”42 Of course, Dhuem fell into relativism because he could not correctly explain the relativity of truth. However, his principle of the relativity of knowledge undoubtedly includes dialectical elements and played a positive role in denying the absolutist metaphysics of classical theory. Similarly, Poincare also correctly described the relationship between the relativity and absoluteness of knowledge when he talked about the flexibility of some of the basic principles of physics43 and predicted a general overview of the new mechanics.44 Because of this, Poincare was able to form relatively correct views concerning the laws of scientific development.
3) Conventionalism.
Poincare thought that the “character of free convention [is]
recognizable in certain fundamental principles of the sciences…These conventions are the work of the free activity of our mind.” At first glance, this seems to be idealist dogma. However, Poincare went on to point out clearly that “liberty is not license…The world [the scholar] thinks he discovers is not simply created by his own caprice.”45 From Poincare’s point of view, when selecting among all possible conventions, we are not only “guided by experimental facts” but are also “limited … by the necessity of avoiding all contradiction.”46 He also thought that a generalization is in fact a hypothesis and “ought always, as soon as possible and as often as possible, to be subjected to verification. And, of course, if it does not stand this test, it ought to be abandoned without reserve.”47 Obviously, Poincare’s statement that “conventions are the product of the free activity of our mind” does not advocate arbitrary fabrication. Conventionalism not only frees itself from Kant’s a priorism, particularly with respect to absolute metaphysics in the treatment of classical theory, but also breaks away from Hume’s empiricism. Poincare’s views reflect the need for free creation and free hypothesizing in science and are of positive value to philosophy. The claim that “concept are the creation of thought”, proposed and applied by Einstein throughout his scientific work was rooted in Poincare’s conventionalism.
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