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对纯粹的显示机制依赖度的减少。

在标准的委托—代理模型[Mirrless，1974，1975]中，委托人在某种程度上说是处于“绝对无知”的状态中，而且，委托人直接以利润最大化为委托任务。其后的一些修正版本[Holmstrom，1979]中，意识到了委托人“绝对无知”假设的不可靠性，即依靠其他一些变量来了解代理人努力水平的必要性。从信息经济学的角度而言，“绝对无知”状态造成的问题是：既对技术性细节缺乏了解，又不想依靠高成本的显示机制，委托人如何实现对代理人的控制。以经验化的“知识”来解释委托人的这一悖论是有益的。经验知识包含了处理特定类型事件的一般性做法，用博弈论观点来看，即通过长期博弈得出的“规则”性的行为方法。“规则”的特殊之处在于，能适用于多种不同场合的具体细节问题。

在真实的科层制度中，经验性知识的使用也带来了任务传递的问题。科层的层级分解不能保证企业的最初目标函数不被扭曲，即经验性知识必须保证目标函数扭曲程度在企业的忍受范围内，这本身也是对经验性知识的适用性的要求。

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Phanomenologischen Philosophie, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1976 22．Laffont, J., Maskin, E., & J.C. Rochet, Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Two-Dimensional Characteristics [in information, Incentives, & Economics Mechanisms, Volume in Honor of L. Hurwicz], University of Minnesota Press,1987

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